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force that arise from electing unready 
presidents and using poor or flawed 
strategic judgment, and to ensure that 
sufficient knowledge and understanding 
of the reasons for using or rejecting 
military force are in place� He calls for 
a “brains based approach” to strategic 
thinking—a term that I, as army and 
defense chief, borrowed shamelessly� 
He proposes a “Bletchley Park–like 
capacity” for using open-source material 
available on social media and unclas-
sified avenues such as Google Earth to 
enhance knowledge and understanding�
Some of Ullman’s recommendations are 
unique to the United States, but in the 
main any and all leaders and students 
of national security will benefit greatly 
from this book� Indeed, to reinforce 
the recommendation of Messrs� Powell, 
Kerry, and Jones, read this book! And, 
as Lord Dobbs adds, this is a very 
good and intriguing read as well�
LORD RICHARDS OF HERSTMONCEUX
Fragile Rise: Grand Strategy and the Fate of Im-
perial Germany, 1871–1914, by Xu Qiyu, trans� 
Joshua Hill� Foreword by Graham Allison� Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017� 368 pages� $32�
Once in a great while, a book allows the 
familiar to be viewed through new eyes� 
Fragile Rise is such a volume� On its 
surface, it is an account of imperial Ger-
many’s catastrophic grand strategy be-
tween the nation’s founding in 1871 and 
the onset of the First World War� While 
this is well-tilled ground, Fragile Rise 
provides a clear and convincing account 
of how Otto von Bismarck mitigated the 
tensions created by Germany’s newfound 
power within the European system, and 
how his successors failed at the same 
task� But what makes Fragile Rise unique 
is less what it says than who is saying 
it� The author, Xu Qiyu, is an active-
duty colonel in the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) who serves 
as deputy director of the Institute for 
Strategic Studies at the National Defense 
University in Beijing—the counterpart 
to the U�S� National Defense University�
USN readers who harbor cartoonish 
images of our PLA counterparts may 
be surprised at the depth of research 
and insight offered in this volume� Xu 
has been a visiting fellow and guest of a 
number of prestigious Western institu-
tions, including the Naval War College, 
where he is respected as a subtle and 
engaging thinker� His research and writ-
ing reflect that experience, informed by 
international scholarship and primary-
source material from across Europe�
Throughout the book, Xu draws no 
explicit parallels between the German 
and Chinese experiences, although the 
book’s translator points out that the 
cover of the Chinese edition features the 
words “When it is difficult to see clearly 
into the future, looking back into his-
tory, even the history of other peoples, 
might be the right choice�” In China 
there is a long tradition of using histori-
cal examples to offer implicit criticism 
of what may not be criticized officially, 
and how Fragile Rise can be viewed in 
this light is apparent upon reading�
Xu characterizes the newly unified 
Germany as following a “hide and bide” 
strategy, recalling Deng Xiaoping’s 
guidance that an emerging China 
should hide its capabilities and bide its 
time, avoiding international leadership 
and the complications that come from 
displays of power� By 1878, however, 
Germany found itself a factor and a 
source of concern in the international 
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arena, despite its preference for the 
low-key� Bismarck’s active management 
mitigated the international friction 
that this shift in power engendered� If 
one seeks a hopeful message, Graham 
Allison observes in his foreword that 
Xu proposes that skilled leaders can 
“reshape unfavorable situations�”
Nonetheless, Xu notes that Bismarck was 
managing a “fundamental” conflict, one 
woven into the fabric of a possible power 
transition� The environment was rife 
with suspicion, and the European system 
offered little tolerance for strategic error� 
Xu assesses that, following Bismarck’s 
dismissal, Germany committed two 
significant blunders� First, it embarked 
on an expensive naval expansion that 
was tangential to its core interests� Its 
appetite for such an effort was fed by 
a consistent insensitivity to the value 
Great Britain placed on sea power� 
Dismissing arguments that German 
overseas trade and colonial possessions 
justified the risk of strategic confronta-
tion, Xu notes that Tirpitz’s “luxury 
fleet” cost Germany any chance of 
accommodation with Britain� By 1907, 
as Germany’s primary strategic  
adversary—despite significant 
economic and cultural ties—Britain 
embraced what was effectively 
a containment policy�
Second, Xu is similarly critical of the 
German army’s failure to subordinate its 
military planning to Germany’s wider 
political ends� Given that Xu serves a 
military controlled by a single political 
party, there is perhaps no more pointed 
criticism in the PLA vernacular�
Fragile Rise devotes lengthy and 
thoughtful attention to the role of 
popular opinion in driving Germany 
to unwise strategic choices� Germany’s 
rapid rise was a source of pride among 
the German people, but it created 
pressures that German institutions were 
poorly prepared to mitigate� Indeed, Xu 
argues that the Weltpolitik policy of the 
late Wilhelmine period was primarily 
a product of domestic pressures� In a 
China in which the ruling Communist 
Party makes massive investments in 
managing, shaping, and controlling 
public opinion, such concern resonates�
At least one American reviewer has been 
critical of the tendency for U�S� readers 
to view Fragile Rise through the lens of 
United States–China power dynamics, 
arguing that it should be respected as a 
contribution to the historical literature 
in its own right� While this is true, 
naval professionals naturally—given the 
author’s association with China’s senior 
military college—will be less interested 
in issues of historical interpretation  
than of Chinese perceptions of historical  
corollary�
It is possible that an American reader 
will be left with the impression that a 
lively debate over the wisdom of China’s 
present course is ongoing� In fact, Fragile 
Rise was completed in 2011 during the 
closing days of Hu Jintao’s rule, when 
the environment in Beijing was more 
open and China’s course less certain� Xi 
Jinping effectively has ended this debate� 
Recent pronouncements of the ruling 
Communist Party leave no doubt that 
China has embraced its expanding role 
in the world and the naval expansion 
that supports it� All that remains to see is 
whether China can produce a Bismarck 
who can navigate around the shoals 
along the way� In the meantime, Fragile 
Rise presents a small window into a 
debate that largely has passed into his-
tory already, as well as the thinking that 
accompanied the charting of that course�
DALE C� RIELAGE
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   153 5/1/18   11:11 AM
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 3, Art. 13
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/13
